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SME Questionnaire Form - December 15

Publication Target Date: December 15

Submission Deadline: October 20

Article Working Title: Beyond Zones and Conduits: Protecting Safety Instrumented Systems as a Cyber-Physical Target

Editorial Brief: Segmentation into zones and conduits remains foundational, but the most consequential attacks against critical infrastructure target the cyber-physical system as a whole — the relationship between what a sensor reports, what logic decides, and what an actuator does — in ways that a zone boundary does not address. 

The article should push past the segmentation orthodoxy and examine the integrity of the control and safety loop itself: how a spoofed or falsified signal can cause a correctly functioning safety system to take exactly the wrong action, how the assumptions embedded in a safety function become attack surface, and why protecting the network is necessary but not sufficient. It should draw on documented cases where the safety logic itself was the vulnerability and on the methods practitioners use to validate that a safety function cannot be defeated by manipulated inputs — cross-checking signals, diversity in measurement, and engineered verification independent of the logic solver.

It should be honest about the limits of detection in environments where the malicious state looks like a plausible process state. This is among the most advanced topics in the series, and its lessons apply to every operator whose safety or protection systems rely on field signals that an adversary could influence.

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Question Set

When a Safety Instrumented System (SIS) receives falsified or spoofed field signals but otherwise functions as designed, what failure modes can arise? Which assumptions built into safety logic are most vulnerable to manipulation?

How can operators distinguish manipulated field signals from legitimate process conditions, particularly when both appear plausible? What role do signal cross-checking, measurement diversity, and independent verification play, and where do these approaches fall short?

Beyond zones and conduits, what additional safeguards are needed to protect the integrity of the control and safety loop itself? What practical or operational challenges arise when implementing these protections?

Which documented industrial cyber incidents best illustrate attacks against control or safety functions? What weaknesses did the attackers exploit, and why were existing security measures insufficient?

Where do operators, control engineers, and safety teams tend to overlook cyber-physical risks when relying primarily on network segmentation? What should they be doing differently to validate the integrity of their safety functions?

Thank you for your response!