Publication Target Date: November 17
Submission Deadline: October 20
Article Working Title: Continuous Process Manufacturing: Why Cybersecurity Looks Different When You Cannot Stop the Plant
Editorial Brief: Continuous process environments, refineries, chemical plants, LNG facilities, and pulp and paper operate under constraints that make standard OT security practices either impractical or genuinely dangerous. The article should establish what makes these environments structurally distinct and what cybersecurity looks like when the plant literally cannot stop. Safety Instrumented Systems are designed to prevent catastrophic physical events, and cybersecurity controls that interact with them introduce risk that practitioners in IT environments do not face.
Patching follows a fundamentally different logic when maintenance windows are measured in months. Network segmentation requires engineering analysis of process dependencies before any topology change. Incident response options are constrained by the consequences of isolating a system that is actively controlling a hazardous process.
The article should be specific about these constraints and examine what compensating controls practitioners are deploying in their absence, how continuous process environments are handling the accumulation of known vulnerabilities they cannot patch, and what incident response actually looks like when shutting down is not an option. Cross-sector comparison should be included: what continuous process shares with discrete manufacturing and where the approaches diverge completely.