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SME Questionnaire Form - October 6

Publication Target Date: October 6


Submission Deadline: August 24


Article Working Title: Ports and Maritime: Securing the Logistics Backbone of the Economy


Editorial Brief: Ports are where cyber risk becomes economic risk at national scale, and where the boundary between IT, OT, and supply-chain logistics is most blurred. The article should examine the maritime and port environment as a system: terminal operating systems that orchestrate the movement of containers, the crane, gate, and yard automation that physically handles cargo, the vessel systems that increasingly connect to shore, and the dependence of the entire flow on scheduling and logistics data that, when unavailable, brings physical operations to a halt even when the control systems are intact. It should treat the regulatory and governance landscape — MTSA and the US Coast Guard's expanding maritime cyber expectations, IMO guidance, and the patchwork of port authority, terminal operator, and carrier responsibilities that makes accountability genuinely hard. It should be specific about documented disruption to major shipping and terminal operators, the role of widely used and widely scrutinized crane and equipment suppliers in the hardware-provenance debate, and what degraded-mode operation looks like at a terminal. The lessons about logistics-data dependency, multi-party accountability, and hardware provenance apply directly to rail, aviation cargo, and any operator whose physical output depends on a digital orchestration layer.

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Question Set

How does a loss of your terminal operating system or logistics data halt physical cargo movement even when the OT is intact, and how long can you operate degraded?

How is accountability for cybersecurity divided among the port authority, terminal operators, and carriers, and where does that division create gaps?

What do MTSA and Coast Guard maritime cyber expectations actually require of your environment, and where is the compliance-reality gap?

How are you approaching the provenance and trust of crane and equipment hardware and its embedded connectivity?

What does the security boundary between connected vessel systems and shore infrastructure look like, and who owns it?

What would meaningfully reduce systemic cyber risk across the port ecosystem rather than at a single facility?

Thank you for your response!