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SME Questionnaire Form - September 15

Publication Target Date: September 15

Submission Deadline: Aug 24

Article Working Title: Cyber-Informed Engineering: Moving Defense Out of the Network and Into the Process

Editorial Brief:

The most important shift in critical-infrastructure security thinking is the recognition that not every consequence can or should be managed with network control. Cyber-informed engineering asks a different question: where can the physics, the engineered design, and the existing safety architecture be used to make a high-consequence outcome impossible or survivable regardless of what happens on the network? 

The article should make this concrete rather than aspirational. It should connect to the established discipline of process-hazard and layers-of-protection analysis and show how cyber is added as another initiating cause, then walk through how engineered controls — mechanical interlocks, relief devices, analog backstops, out-of-band trips — can be deliberately positioned so that a cyber compromise cannot drive the process to a catastrophic state. It should draw on the principles bodies that have formalized this thinking and be honest about what it requires: security practitioners who understand the process, engineers who understand that cyber is a hazard, and the two working from a shared analysis. The article should also address where cyber-informed engineering is oversold, and where network and monitoring controls remain irreplaceable. This is the most transferable topic in the series: every vertical can identify a small number of consequences worth engineering out.

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Question Set

Where have you used engineered or analog controls to make a high-consequence cyber outcome impossible or survivable, and how did you decide where to apply them?

How do you bring cyber into your existing process-hazard or layers-of-protection analysis as an initiating cause?

What does it take, organizationally, to get security practitioners and process engineers working from a shared hazard analysis?

Where is cyber-informed engineering oversold, and where do network and monitoring controls remain irreplaceable?

How do you prioritize which consequences are worth the engineering effort to design out versus manage with cyber controls?

What would you tell an operator just starting to apply cyber-informed engineering about where to begin?

Thank you for your response!